Negligence - Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress Permitted to Mother Who Witnessed the Violent Death of Her Child Even Though the Mother Was Outside Zone of Danger by Issadore, Bruce A.
Volume 25 Issue 1 Article 11 
1979 
Negligence - Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress 
Permitted to Mother Who Witnessed the Violent Death of Her 
Child Even Though the Mother Was Outside Zone of Danger 
Bruce A. Issadore 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Law and Psychology Commons, Legal Remedies Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bruce A. Issadore, Negligence - Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress Permitted to Mother 
Who Witnessed the Violent Death of Her Child Even Though the Mother Was Outside Zone of Danger, 25 
Vill. L. Rev. 195 (1979). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol25/iss1/11 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
NEGLIGENCE-RECOVERY FOR NEGLIGENTLY INFLICTED MENTAL
DISTRESS PERMITTED TO MOTHER WHO WITNESSED THE VIOLENT
DEATH OF HER CHILD EVEN THOUGH THE MOTHER WAS OUTSIDE
ZONE OF DANGER.
Sinn v. Burd (Pa. 1979)
While standing near the front door of her home on June 12,
1975, Mrs. JoAnne Sinn saw an automobile strike her daughter and
hurl the child through the air, causing injuries that resulted in the
girl's death.' Mrs. Sinn was located outside the area endangered by
the vehicle and had no reason to fear for her own safety. 2 On June
3, 1976, the Sinn family filed a four-count trespass complaint in the
court of common pleas against Brad Burd, the driver of the au-
tomobile. 3 One count was brought by Mrs. Sinn to recover for emo-
tional distress suffered as a result of witnessing the fatal occurrence.
4
Finding that Mrs. Sinn was not within the zone of danger, 5 the trial
1. Sinn v. Burd, __ Pa. - - 404 A.2d 672, 674 (1979). The victim, Lisa Sinn, was
standing with her sister Deborah along the edge of the road in front of their home. Id. The
automobile narrowly missed striking Deborah. Id.
2. Id. at __ 404 A.2d at 673. For a discussion of the relevance of Mrs. Sinn's location
with respect to the place of the accident, see text accompanying note 33 infra.
3. Id. at __, 404 A.2d at 674. The first count was brought under Pennsylvania's then-
current wrongful death statute which provided in pertinent part: "[T]he persons entitled to
recover damages for any injuries causing death, shall be [inter alios] the .. .parents of the
deceased .... Act of Apr. 26, 1855, Pub. L. No. 323, § 1, 1855 Pa. Laws 309 (current version
at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8301 (Purdon 1979)). With respect to damages, the statute
provided:
[T]he plaintiff may recover, in addition to the damages now recoverable in such actions,
the expenses incurred for medical and surgical care and for nursing of the deceased, and
such other expenses caused by the injury which resulted in death as could have been
recovered in an action begun by the injured person in his lifetime; and plaintiff may also
recover the reasonable funeral expenses of the deceased ....
Act of May 13, 1927, Pub. L. No. 480, § 1, 1927 Pa. Laws 992 (current version at 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 8301 (Purdon 1979)). The second count was brought on behalf of the deceased
daughter under the Pennsylvania Survival Act which provides in pertinent part: "All causes of
action or proceedings, real or personal, except actions for slander or libel, shall survive the
death of the plaintiff or of the defendant .... " Act of Apr. 18, 1949, Pub. L. No. 121, § 601,
1949 Pa. Laws 541 (current version at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8302 (Purdon 1979)). The
third count was brought on behalf of Deborah for the psychological damages she sustained as a
result of witnessing the fatal accident in which her sister died. - Pa. at -, 404 A.2d at 674.
For the final count, see note 4 and accompanying text infra.
4. - Pa. at __ 404 A.2d at 674. Mrs. Sinn's claim stated, inter alia, that she had
become emotionally shattered from viewing the accident, and, as a consequence, suffered a
shock to her nervous system and grievous mental pain which resulted in severe depression and
an acute nervous condition. Id. Mrs. Sinn further alleged that as a result of the foregoing, she
incurred expenses for medicine and tranquilizers, and might be required to expend considerable
sums in the future for the treatment of her resulting injuries and mental trauma. Id. at -, 404
A.2d at 675.
5. For a discussion of the traditional "zone of danger" requirement, see notes 32-43 &
47-54 and accompanying text infra.
(195)
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court sustained defendant's demurrer to this count, 6 and, on appeal,
the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed without opinion.
7
In a plurality decision, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania re-
versed and remanded," holding that a cause of action exists when a
mother, not within the zone of personal danger, suffers emotional
shock from personal observance of the event which causes the violent
death of her small child. Sinn v. Burd, - Pa. , ,
404 A.2d 672, 686 (1979).
Traditionally, recovery for the negligent infliction of emotional
distress I was viewed with disfavor by the courts.10 The reluctance of
courts to award such damages stemmed from their fears that to per-
mit recovery would 1) burden the judicial system with increased liti-
6. - Pa. at -, 404 A.2d at 675. Appellee had demurred to both the third and fourth
counts, "claiming that the complaint failed to aver that Deborah and appellant were in personal
danger of physical impact, that they feared such physical impact, or that they suffered physical
injury as a result of the emotional distress caused by the accident." Id. The demurrer to the
third count was overruled by the trial court which found that Deborah was within the zone of
danger and, thus, could proceed with her action. Id. For a discussion of the "zone of danger"
rule, see notes 32-43 & 47-54 and accompanying text infra.
7. 253 Pa. Super. Ct. 627, 384 A.2d 1003 (1978).
8. - Pa. at -, 404 A.2d at 686. Justice Nix, joined by Justice Manderino, delivered the
opinion of the court. Chief Justice Eagen filed a concurring opinion, while Justice Larsen con-
curred only in the result. Id. Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice O'Brien
joined. Id. The seventh seat on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was vacant at the time of this
decision.
9. The phrase "emotional distress" has been used interchangeably with phrases such as
"mental anguish," "mental harm," "emotional disturbance," and "mental suffering," all of which
convey equally vague meanings. See Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case
for an Independent Tort, 59 CEO. L.J. 1237, 1238 n.7 (1971). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 46, Comment j (1965). Comment j defines "emotional distress" to include "all
highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embar-
rassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry and nausea," Id. Compare Cosgrove v.
Beymer, 244 F. Supp. 824, 826 (1965) ("shock or mental anguish") with Knaub v. Gotwalt, 422
Pa. 267, 270, 220 A.2d 646, 647 (1966) ("fright or nervous shock or mental or emotional distur-
bances or distress").
10. See, e.g., Huston v. Borough of Freemansburg, 212 Pa. 548, 550, 61 A. 1022, 1023
(1905). In denying recovery for fright and resulting death caused by a nearby explosion, the
Huston court stated:
In the last half century the ingenuity of counsel, stimulated by the cupidity of clients and
encouraged by the prejudices of juries, has expanded the action for negligence until it
overtops all others in frequency and importance; but it is only in the very end of that
period that it has been stretched to the effort to cover so intangible, so untrustworthy, so
illusory, and so speculative a cause of action as mere mental disturbance.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Western Union Tel. Co. v. Wood, 57 F. 471 (5th Cir. 1893);
Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896). See generally W. PROSSER, LAw
OF TORTS § 54, at 327 (4th ed. 1971).
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gation; 11 2) proliferate fraudulent claims 12 due to the inherent dif-
ficulties in proving mental distress; 13 and 3) impose liability upon a
tortfeasor disproportionate to the culpability of his conduct. 14  It ap-
pears, however, that the courts were primarily concerned with the
second factor-the potential for fraudulent claims-because eventu-
ally they began to permit recovery under circumstances which tended
to verify the genuineness of the mental harm. 15 Thus, when the
alleged emotional suffering could be attributed to a plaintiff's physical
11. See, e.g., Kalen v. Terre Haute & I.R.R., 18 Ind. App. 202, 213, 47 N.E. 694, 698
(1897) (uncertainties in ascertaining the truth would encourage litigation); Mitchell v. Rochester
By., 151 N.Y. 107, 110, 45 N.E. 354, 354-55 (1896) (recovery would result in flood of litigation);
Knaub v. Gotwalt, 422 Pa. 267, 271, 220 A.2d 646, 647 (1966) ("courts would be swamped by
virtual avalanche of cases"); Ewing v. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. By., 147 Pa. 40, 43, 23 A.
340, 340 (1892) (recovery would increase scope of so called "accident cases"). But cf. Robb v.
Pennsylvania R. R., 58 Del. 454, 463, 210 A.2d 709, 714 (1965) (if there is a flood of litigation,
the courts must willingly cope with it); Falzone v, Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 567, 214 A.2d 12, 16
(1965) (expansion of litigation should not deter courts in granting relief for meritorious claims);
Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 412, 261 A.2d 84, 89 (1970) (courts should remedy wrongs
even at the expense of increased litigation); Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury Resulting from
Negligence Without Impact, 50 AM. L. REC. 141, 172-73 (1902) (policy of law is and should be
to encourage litigation); Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37
MICH. L. REV. 874, 877 (1939) (fear of increased litigation is a poor reason for denying relief to
one suffering genuine mental injury).
12. See, e.g., Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 290, 47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897) (recovery
would open door for unjust claims); Mitchell v. Rochester By., 151 N.Y. 107, 110, 45 N.E. 354,
354-55 (1896) (injury may be easily feigned); Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 169, 142 A.2d
263, 266-67 (1958) (for every genuine claim there would be a tremendous number of illusory
ones). But see Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 616, 249 N.E.2d 419, 442, 301 N.Y.S.2d
544, 559 (1969) (difficulty of proof should not cause arbitrary denial of all claims). See also note
59 infra.
13. See Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 168-69, 142 A.2d 263, 266-67 (1958); Ward v. West
Jersey & S.R.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 385, 47 A. 561, 562 (1900). In recent years, however, most
courts have agreed that emotional distress is capable of medical proof. See, e.g., Orlo v. Con-
necticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 236, 21 A.2d 402, 404 (1941) (advance in medical knowledge has
minimized difficulty in tracing resulting injury through fright to negligent conduct), cited in
Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 58 Del. 454, 460, 210 A.2d 709, 712 (1965); Niederman v. Brodsky,
436 Pa. 401, 406, 261 A.2d 84, 86 (1970) (improved techniques and equipment require us to
give greater credit to medical evidence). Similarly, many commentators have recognized the
advances of medical science in diagnosing emotional distress. See, e.g., Cantor, Psychosomatic
Injury, Traumatic Psychoneurosis, and Law, 6 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 428, 430-37 (1957); Smith,
Relations of Emotion to Injury and Disease, 30 VA. L. REv. 193, 303-04 (1943).
14. See, e.g., Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 290, 47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897) (un-
reasonable to require one who is merely negligent to anticipate consequences resulting from
fright); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 613, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (1935) (liability for emo-
tional harm would be wholly out of proportion to defendant's culpability).
15. Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 402-03, 520 P.2d 758, 761-62 (1974) (courts resorted
to artificial standards tending to guarantee that the claim was not spurious). For courts permit-
ting recovery for mental harm when special circumstances exist to insure the validity of the
damages, see, e.g., Pennsylvania Co. v. White, 242 F. 437, 440 (6th Cir. 1917) (damages for
fright are recoverable when plaintiff suffers physical injuries from defendant's negligence);
Southern By. v. Owen, 156 Ky. 827, 831, 162 SW. 110, 111 (1914) (slight physical injury is
sufficient to permit jury to determine damages for mental distress). See also W. PROSSER, supra
note 10, at 328.
3
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injury, courts were willing to permit recovery for the emotional dis-
tress. 16
This requirement of physical injury, which became commonly
known as the "impact rule," 17 was consistently applied in Pennsyl-
vania,' thus obviating the application of traditional tort concepts such
as proximate cause, in mental distress cases. 19 Nonetheless, proba-
bly out of a concern for meritorious claimants who could be barred by
the impact requirement, the Pennsylvania courts began to make in-
roads on the rule by granting relief in cases where the contem-
poraneous physical injury contributed little in attesting to the
genuineness of the claim for emotional disturbance. 20  For instance,
in Hess v. Philadelphia Transportation Co.,21 plaintiff sought dam-
ages for his mental distress and subsequent neurosis allegedly caused
by an electric shock that he sustained when defendant's overhead
trolley wire came in contact with plaintiff's car. 22 Although expert
16. See cases cited note 15 supra; cf. Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 290, 47
N.E. 88, 89 (1897) (no recovery for distress without accompanying physical injury); Mitchell v.
Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 109, 45 N.E. 354, 354 (1896) (no recovery for mere fright without
immediate personal injury).
17. See Sinn v. Burd, - Pa. at , 404 A.2d at 675; W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at 331.
18. See, e.g., Knaub v. Gotwalt, 422 Pa. 267, 270, 220 A.2d 646, 647 (1966); Bosley v.
Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 164, 142 A.2d 263, 264 (1958); Potere v. Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 581, 589,
112 A.2d 100, 104 (1955); Ewing v. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry., 147 Pa. 40, 44, 23 A. 340,
340-41 (1892) (alternative holding).
19. The requirement of physical injury or physical impact, in lieu of deciding the question
on the basis of foreseeability or proximate cause, was initiated in Pennsylvania early in the 20th
century. See Huston v. Borough of Freemansburg, 212 Pa. 548, 61. A. 1022 (1905). Prior to
Huston, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied traditional tort concepts in analyzing claims
for damages based on emotional harm. See, e.g., Ewing v. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry., 147
Pa. 40, 23 A. 340 (1892); Fox v. Borkey, 126 Pa. 164, 17 A. 604 (1889). In Fox, the court denied
a claim for mental distress and nervous shock that was not accompanied by physical injury,
holding that the harm complained of was not foreseeable and, thus, was not the ordinary or
proximate result of defendant's act. 126 Pa. at 169, 17 A. at 604-05. Three years later, in Ewing,
the court faced another claim for emotional disturbance unaccompanied by a contemporaneous
physical injury, although the plaintiff did claim subsequent illness and disability. 147 Pa. at 41,
23 A. at 340. In denying recovery, the court based its holding on two theories: 1) that plaintiff's
mental distress was not the proximate result of defendant's conduct; and 2) that mere fright,
unaccompanied by bodily injury, is not actionable. Id. at 44, 23 A. at 340-41. Despite the fact
that Ewing involved alternative holdings, the case has been credited as being a leading decision
in establishing the impact rule in the United States. See Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 58 Del.
454, 458-59, 210 A.2d 709, 711 (1965).
In 1905, the Huston court clearly replaced the previous approach of applying basic tort
principles with the requirement of physical injury in mental distress cases. See 212 Pa. at 550,
61 A. at 1022. The court stated that even though there was sufficient evidence of negligence
and proximate cause to carry the case to the jury, "there can be no recovery of damages from
fright or other merely mental suffering unconnected with physical injury." Id. at 549-50, 61 A.
at 1022.
20. See notes 21-27 and accompanying text infra.
21. 358 Pa. 144, 56 A.2d 89 (1948).
22. Id. at 144-45, 56 A.2d at 89-90. According to the plaintiff, the electric current lifted him
out of his seat. Id. at 144-45, 56 A.2d at 89. Two engineers, however, offered evidence to prove
that a party in an automobile is insulated from such shock. Id. at 146-47, 56 A.2d at 89. The
4
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testimony established that plaintiff had suffered no physical injuries,2 3
the court was apparently unwilling to deny relief to one sustaining
such a sudden, forceful impact at the hand of another.2 4  Thus, re-
covery for mental distress was permitted in Hess.2 5  Similarly,
Pennsylvania courts allowed relief when claimants had suffered minor
physical injuries that provided little authenticity to the claim of men-
tal distress, 26 as well as when the alleged physical injuries were not
externally visible. 27  Nevertheless, these inroads upon the impact
rule were relatively rare,2 8 and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
court nevertheless affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff, concluding that the jury was justified in
believing the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 148, 56 A.2d at 91.
23. Id. at 146, 56 A.2d at 90. Plaintiff's physician testified "that plaintiff had no organic
injuries but apparently was suffering from a mental neurosis which made him believe many
things were wrong with him." Id.
24. See id. at 148, 56 A.2d at 91. The Hess court reasoned that "[an electric shock is 'a
direct and personal assault,' and any fright or nervous disorders arising from such an 'assault'
negligently caused is compensable in damages." Id., citing Buckbee v. Third Ave. R.R., 64
A.D. 360, 72 N.Y.S. 217 (1901). It is submitted that by emphasizing the severity of the impact,
rather than the accompanying physical injury, the Hess decision may have led later courts in
Pennsylvania to begin allowing recovery for mental distress under the impact rule, even in
situations where the minor injuries from such impact did little to demonstrate the genuineness
of the claim. See notes 26-27 and accompanying text infra.
25. 358 Pa. at 148-49, 56 A.2d at 91.
26. See Potere v. Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 581, 589, 112 A.2d 100, 104 (1955). In Potere,
plaintiff's automobile fell through a city street that was under construction. Id. at 584, 112 A.2d
at 102. Plaintiff suffered a sprained ankle, bruised elbow, stiff neck, and severe shock to his
nervous system, the latter being diagnosed as anxiety neurosis caused by the accident. Id. at
588, 112 A.2d at 104. In permitting recovery for all of plaintiff's injuries, the major amount of
which compensated plaintiff for his anxiety neurosis, the Potere court held: "Where ...a plain-
tiff sustains bodily injuries, even though trivial or minor in character, which are accompanied by
fright or mental suffering directly traceable to the peril in which the defendant's negligence
placed the plaintiff, then mental suffering is a legitimate element of damages." Id., citing Hess
v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 358 Pa. 144, 56 A.2d 89 (1948); Applebaum v. Philadelphia Rapid
Transit Co., 244 Pa. 82, 90 A. 462 (1914). Accord, Porter v. Delaware Lack. & W.R.R., 73
N.J.L. 405, 406, 63 A. 860, 860 (1928) (dust in eyes was a sufficient impact). But cf. Chittick v.
Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 224 Pa. 13, 17-18, 73 A. 4, 6 (1909) (recovery denied although
plaintiff suffered bruises when a nearby explosion threw her to the floor).
27. See Howarth v. Adams Exp. Co., 269 Pa. 280, 282-83, 112 A. 536, 537 (1921). Although
a judgment for the plaintiff in the lower court was reversed and remanded on other grounds,
the Howarth court stated:
Here there were no visible external marks upon the person of Mrs. Howarth, but her
own testimony, and that of her physicians, indicate an actual physical injury to her back,
sufficient to take the case to the jury .. . .While a recovery should not be sustained in
such case upon dubious evidence, it cannot be affirmed as matter of law that the physical
injury must be externally visible.
Id. at 282-83, 112 A. at 537 (citations omitted). See also Samarra v. Allegheny Valley St. Ry.,
238 Pa. 469, 86 A. 287 (1913).
28. See Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 179-81, 142 A.2d 263, 272-73 (1958) (Musmanno,
J., dissenting). Justice Musmanno, a firm believer that emotional distress could be caused with-
out physical injury or impact, stated: "I have said that this Court has been consistent in refusing
recovery in this type of case. I must modify that statement somewhat. There has been an
occasion or two when a ray of wholesome and humane inconsistency broke through the dark
clouds of illogical consistency." Id. at 179, 142 A.2d at 272 (Musmanno, J., dissenting). See
notes 21-27 and accompanying text supra.
5
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strongly reiterated its requirement of physical impact in its 1966 deci-
sion of Knaub v. Gotwalt 29-even though it had earlier recognized
that the doctrine was no longer followed by a majority of courts.
30
The Knaub decision thus kept Pennsylvania among the minority
of jurisdictions which continued to rely upon the impact rule; 3 1 most
jurisdictions had adopted the so-called "zone of danger" doctrine.32
Under the zone of danger test, one who is in the immediate zone of
personal danger caused by another's negligent conduct-i.e., one
For cases denying relief for negligent infliction of emotional distress when impact was ab-
sent, see, e.g., Knaub v. Gotwalt, 422 Pa. 267, 220 A.2d 646 (1966); Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa.
161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958); Koplin v. Louis K. Liggett Co., 322 Pa. 333, 185 A. 744 (1936);
Morris v. Lackawanna & Wy. V.R.B., 228 Pa. 198, 77 A. 445 (1910); Ewing v. Pittsburgh, C.,
C. & St. L. Ry., 147 Pa. 40, 23 A. 340 (1892).
29. 422 Pa. 267, 220 A.2d 646 (1966) (sister and parents of victim denied recovery for men-
tal shock sustained from witnessing automobile strike and kill victim). See also Bosley v. An-
drews, 393 Pa.161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958) (recovery denied for heart ailments occasioned by
plaintiff's fright and fall when being chased by defendant's trespassing bull). Even in Bosley,
however, there were indications that the impact requirement was losing its adherents on the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Justice Musmanno, dissenting on the ground that only an
arbitrary rule would deny relief to innocent victims suffering grievous injuries, stated in Bosley:
[I]t is inexplicable how this Court can legally dispose of a controversy which is peculiarly
one for a jury's determination .... To say that to grant what the law allows in this case
might create an untoward situation in other cases is like saying that the fountain of justice
should be boarded up because of the possibility that someone might drown in its salutary
waters.
In recapitulation I wish to go on record that the policy of non-liability announced by
the Majority in this type of case is insupportable in law, logic, and elementary justice-
and I shall continue to dissent from it until the cows come home.
Id. at 194-95, 142 A.2d at 279-80 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
30. See Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 167-68, 142 A.2d 263, 266 (1958); note 32 and
accompanying text infra. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at 332. Dean Prosser stated that
after Justice Musmanno's "literary dissent" in Bosley, "which may well be one of the classics of
the law, it became apparent that the impact rule is destined for rapid extinction, and might
perhaps even never be applied again." Id. Although Dean Prosser's words proved to be pro-
phetic for Pennsylvania law, see notes 44-47 and accompanying text infra, the Knaub decision
indicated that a majority of the court had not yet abandoned the impact rule. See note 29 and
accompanying text supra. This led Justice Musmanno to vehemently dissent again, -stating:
It is a matter of infinite regret to me that in the train of Progress in the Law of
Humanity, Pennsylvania is a car frequently clattering close to the caboose instead of
cheerfully gliding over the rails immediately behind the locomotive. Why is it that in
ameliorating the rigors of the common law, Pennsylvania must copy after other States,
rather than take the lead?
How many States must repudiate the cruel rule announced in this case before
Pennsylvania consents to march in the procession of recognition of realities?
Id. at 273, 220 A.2d at 648 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
31. Even today, a minority of courts continue to require physical impact. See, e.g., Beaty v.
Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688, 697 (W.D. Ark. 1959) (applying Arkansas
law); Pretsky v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 396 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Mo. 1965).
32. See, e.g., Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 239, 21 A.2d 402, 405 (1941) ("range
of ordinary physical danger"); Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 58 Del. 454, 464, 210 A.2d 709, 714
(1965) ("immediate area of physical danger"); Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 403, 165 A.
182, 184 (1933) ("imminent danger of physical contact"). See also Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 100
(1959).
6
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who fears bodily harm from such conduct-may recover for emo-
tional distress and the resulting physical consequences even though
no physical impact occurred.
33
The zone of danger rule was, however, determined to be in-
adequate by the Supreme Court of California in the 1968 case of Dil-
lon v. Legg,34 where the court permitted bystander recovery.3 5  Con-
fronting a factual setting similar to the situation in Sinn,36 the Dillon
court ruled that recovery will be permitted where a defendant should
have foreseen that his conduct would cause emotional disturbance re-
sulting in physical injuries 37 to a person of average sensitivities. 38
The Dillon decision, however, did not cause the demise of the
zone of danger doctrine, for only one year later, in Tobin v.
Grossman,39 the New York Court of Appeals refused to permit by-
stander recovery.40 The Tobin court declared that permitting persons
beyond the zone of danger to recover for their emotional distress
would create a new duty and that "there are no new technological,
33. See, e.g., Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 58 Del. 454, 210 A.2d 709 (1965); Falzone v.
Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965).
34. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
35. See id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80; note 37 and accompanying text
infra.
36. See notes 1-2 and accompanying text supra.
37. 68 Cal. 2d at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. It should be recognized that the
Dillon court permitted recovery for emotional distress only when there was a resulting physical
injury. Id. The court stated: "We note, first, that we deal here with a case in which plaintiff
suffered a shock which resulted in physical injury and we confine our ruling to that case." Id.
The Supreme Court of California has reaffirmed its position in Dillon that physical injuries
emanating from emotional shock are required before recovery will be permitted. See Krouse v.
Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977). Other jurisdictions have
similarly required some physical manifestation resulting from the mental distress before allowing
recovery. See, e.g., Keck v. Jackson, 122 Ariz. 114, 593 P.2d 668 (1979); D'Amicoi v. Alvarez
Shipping Co., 31 Conn. Supp. 164, 326 A.2d 129 (1973); Neuberg v. Michael Reese Hosp. &
Med. Center, 60 II. App. 3d 679, 377 N.E.2d 215; D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643,
338 A.2d 524 (1975). But cf. Sinn v. Burd, __ Pa. at -, 404 A.2d at 679 (plaintiff need not
show physical manifestation of alleged mental distress).
38. 68 Cal. 2d at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. The Dillon court emphasized the
following factors in determining whether a defendant reasonably should foresee the plaintiff's
injury:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with one
who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional
impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident,
contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether
plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any relation-
ship or the presence of only a distant relationship.
Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
39. 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
40. Id. at 611, 249 N.E.2d at 419-20, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 555. The Tobin court framed the
issue presented to it as "whether a mother may recover against a tort-feasor for her own mental
and physical injuries caused by shock and fear for her two-year-old child who suffered serious
injuries in an automobile accident." Id. at 611, 249 N.E.2d at 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 554.
7
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economic, or social developments" which warrant legal recognition of
an entirely new cause of action. 4' While rejecting the argument that
elimination of the zone of danger rule would cause a proliferation of
both valid and fraudulent claims, 42 the Tobin court did find that the
proposed foreseeability test would lead to unlimited and unduly bur-
densome liability which could not be reasonably circumscribed.
4 3
Confronted with the divergent views enunciated in Dillon and
Tobin, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the 1970 case of
Niederman v. Brodsky,44 was faced with the question of whether it
should discard the impact rule in favor of another standard. In
Niederman, the plaintiff sought recovery for heart damage and shock
that he suffered when defendant's automobile narrowly missed plain-
tiff but struck plaintiff's son who was standing next to him.4 5  Find-
ing that the underpinnings of the impact rule were no longer valid,
the court eliminated the requirement that the plaintiff prove actual
impact in order to recover for the negligent infliction of mental dis-
tress. 46 Adopting the zone of danger doctrine, the Niederman court
held that a cause of action for damages proximately caused by the tort
can be maintained by one who is within the zone of personal danger
and who actually fears the potential impact. 47
41. Id. at 615, 249 N.E.2d at 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
42. See notes 11-13 and accompanying text supra.
43. 24 N.Y.2d at 616, 249 N.E.2d at 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 559. With reference to this
concern, the Tobin court maintained that the eyewitness limitation imposed by the Dillon court
under the foreseeability test provides no rational basis for limiting liability. Id. at 618, 249
N.E.2d at 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 561. In rejecting the Dillon rationale, the court noted that such
factors as the plaintiff's distance from the accident, the age of the victim, and the relationship of
the parties are "too relative to permit creation of only a limited scope of liability or duty." Id. at
618-19, 249 N.E.2d at 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 561. The Tobin court further reasoned that with
respect to bystander recovery, the theory of providing a remedy for every wrong is limited by
the recognition that the law must draw the line somewhere. Id. at 619, 249 N.E.2d at 424, 301
N.Y.S.2d at 561.
44. 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970).
45. Id. at 402-03, 261 A.2d at 84-85. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant negligently drove
his vehicle onto the sidewalk, striking a fire hydrant, a litter pole and a basket, a newsstand,
and eventually plaintiffs son. Id. at 402, 261 A.2d at 84. Almost immediately thereafter, plain-
tiff suffered chest pains, which were later diagnosed as heart failure stemming from an ap-
prehension or fear of impending death. Id. at 402-03, 261 A.2d at 84.
46. Id. at 413, 261 A.2d at 89-90. In rejecting the requirement of physical impact, the
majority gave recognition to Justice Musmanno's strong dissenting opinions in two prior cases
which had denied recovery for mental distress due to the absence of physical injury or impact.
Id. at 403, 261 A.2d at 85. See Knaub v. Gotwalt, 422 Pa. 267, 220 A.2d 646 (1966) (Mus-
manno, J., dissenting); Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958) (Musmanno, J.,
dissenting); notes 29 & 30 supra. The Niederman court noted: "Today the cows come home. We
decide that on the record before us, appellant may go to trial and if he proves his allegations,
recovery may be had from a negligent defendant, despite the fact that appellant's injuries arose
in the absence of actual impact." 436 Pa. at 403, 261 A.2d at 85 (footnotes omitted). Cf. note 29
supra.
47. 436 Pa. at 413, 261 A.2d at 90. Since Niederman, two Pennsylvania Superior Court
decisions have applied the zone of danger doctrine. See Bowman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 245
8
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Against this background, Justice Nix addressed the claim pre-
sented in Sinn 48 by noting that the zone of danger doctrine arbitrar-
ily prevented recovery to Mrs. Sinn who, although not in personal
danger, had allegedly suffered emotional distress from witnessing the
negligent infliction of injury to her minor child. 49 Justice Nix
reasoned that the mental anguish suffered in such bystander cases is
as severe and genuine as the distress suffered by a plaintiff located
within the zone of danger. 50 Indeed, Justice Nix found that the true
cause of harm in either case emanates from the parent witnessing the
serious injury or death of the child, irrespective of whether the par-
ent is personally exposed to possible impact.
51
Having noted the arbitrary limitations of the zone of danger doc-
trine, Justice Nix began his consideration of whether relief should be
afforded to bystanders by presuming that a tortfeasor, whose wrongful
acts are the proximate cause of an innocent plaintiff's injuries, should
be liable for the consequences of his conduct. 52 Justice Nix indicated
that this presumption is rebuttable, but only when there are sufficient
public policy reasons for denying recovery. 53 Within this context,
Justice Nix considered the policy arguments typically advanced as jus-
tifications for limiting liability in cases where a plaintiff outside the
zone of danger alleges mental distress.
54
Pa. Super. Ct. 530, 369 A.2d 754 (1976); Scarf V. Koltoff, 242 Pa. Super. Ct. 294, 363 A.2d
1276 (1976).
48. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
49. - Pa. at __ 404 A.2d at 677. Justice Nix stated that the zone of danger doctrine was
ineffective in carrying forward the basic premise of the common law system "that one may seek
redress for every substantial wrong." Id., quoting Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. at 403, 261
A.2d at 85. See also Comment, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 1089, 1108.
50. - Pa. at __ 404 A.2d at 677. Justice Nix noted that a majority of commentators and
an increasing number of jurisdictions have recognized that the zone of danger concept un-
reasonably limits recovery in bystander cases. Id. at - & n.7, 404 A.2d at 677 & n.7.
51. Id. at -, 404 A.2d at 678. It should be noted that at least one jurisdiction has applied
a modified zone of danger test by allowing recovery for the mental distress suffered from fear of
personal injury as well as for the mental harm attributable to fearing for another's safety. See
Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 402, 165 A. 182, 184 (1933). Accord, RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 436(3), Comment f (1965). In contrast to the Bowman approach, the
majority of jurisdictions which apply the zone of danger rule permit recovery only when the
plaintiff fears for his own safety. See, e.g., Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714, 156 A.2d 149
(1959); Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965).
52. - Pa. at __, 404 A.2d at 681.
53. Id. at - n.13, 404 A.2d at 682 n.13. Justice Nix cautioned that these policy reasons
"must be made very clearly to appear and must be strongly grounded on considerations of
public welfare." Id., quoting Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARV. L. REv. 260, 264
(1921).
54. Id. at -, 404 A.2d at 678. Justice Nix enumerated the arguments against bystander
recovery as follows:
[I] medical science's supposed difficulty in proving causation between the claimed dam-
ages and the alleged fright, [2] the fear of fraudulent or exaggerated claims, [3] the con-
cern that to allow such a recovery will precipitate a veritable flood of litigation, [4] the
9
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Justice Nix first noted that the problem of establishing a causal
nexus between the psychic harm and the fright from witnessing the
accident provides no basis for rebutting the presumption. 55 In Jus-
tice Nix's view, advancements in science have rendered this argu-
ment obsolete. 56 Furthermore, Justice Nix's confidence in such ad-
vancements led him to reject the requirement that a plaintiff prove
resulting physical manifestations of the alleged mental distress 5 7-a
requirement which until Sinn, existed in every state except Hawaii. 58
Moreover, Justice Nix found that the presumption in favor of
permitting recovery was not rebutted by the possibility of increased
litigation, stating that even those courts which deny recovery in
bystander cases recognize that such an argument is without merit.
59
Justice Nix also found that the potential for fraudulent claims is nar-
rowed by the abilities of medical experts and the judicial system to
expose fictitious claims.
60
The argument which Justice Nix noted as being the most deter-
minative of whether recovery in bystander cases should be denied
was the possibility that unlimited and unduly burdensome liability
would be imposed upon the defendant. 61 Although Justice Nix noted
problem of unlimited and unduly burdensome liability, and [5] the difficulty of reasonably
circumscribing the area of liability.
Id. For Justice Nix's treatment of these arguments, see notes 55-66 and accompanying text
infra.
55. See - Pa. at -, 404 A.2d at 678-79.
56. Id. at -, 404 A.2d at 678. For a discussion of the recent trend toward recognizing that
emotional distress is capable of medical proof, see note 13 supra.
57. - Pa. at -, 404 A.2d at 679. The Sinn court decided that the absence of resulting
physical injury is now only a factor to be considered in determining whether a plaintiff is enti-
tled to relief for mental distress, not an absolute bar to such relief. Id. at , -, 404 A.2d at
679, 683, citing Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 403, 520 P.2d 758, 762 (1974). Additionally,
the court stated that the requirement of physical manifestations of emotional distress is merely
another "synthetic device to guarantee the genuineness of the claim." Id., citing Leong v.
Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 404, 520 P.2d 758, 763 (1974).
58. - Pa. at - , 404 A.2d at 689 (Roberts, J., dissenting), citing Leong v. Takasaki, 55
Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974). For a discussion of courts which require a resulting physical
injury from the emotional distress, see note 37 supra.
59. - Pa. at - & n.12, 404 A.2d at 680 & n.12. See Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d at
615-16, 249 N.E.2d at 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 558-59 (denying bystander recovery but rejecting
proliferation of litigation argument). With respect to the increased litigation contention, Justice
Nix stated:
[T]he fundamental concept of our judicial system [is] that any [caseload] increase should
not be determinative or relevant to the availability of a judicial forum for the adjudication
of impartial individual rights. . . .We place the responsibility .. . on the judicial
machinery of the Commonwealth to fulfill its obligation to make itself available to liti-
gants.
Pa. at -, 404 A.2d at 681, quoting Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. at 412, 261 A.2d at 89.
60. - Pa. at -, 404 A.2d at 679-80. Additionally, Justice Nix criticized any finding that
would bar meritorious claims for relief on the ground that other litigants might present fictitious
claims. Id. at __ 404 A.2d at 680.
61. -_Pa. at __ 404 A.2d at 681. The problem of unlimited and unduly burdensome
liability was the major concern confronting the Tobin court. See note 43 and accompanying text
supra.
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that it was this contention that influenced the Tobin court to maintain
the zone of danger rule,6 2 he nevertheless rejected the argument,
stating that the nature of the claim for relief in bystander cases was
overstated in Tobin. 3 In Justice Nix's view, permitting bystander
recovery for emotional distress does not, as the Tobin court found,
create a new cause of action; it is only the scope of the damages from
tortious conduct which is altered.6 4  Such a departure, Justice Nix
maintained, is a function of imposing a greater responsibility upon a
wrongdoer as societal relations become more complex.6 5  Justice Nix
further declared that expanding the scope of a motorist's duty of care
will not lead to unlimited liability, because the concept of "duty" is
no more than a conclusion reached after the law determines that the
particular plaintiff in question is entitled to relief.
66
Thus, after concluding that there were no policy reasons justify-
ing an absolute bar to recovery by bystanders, 6 7 Justice Nix ad-
dressed the problem of how to circumscribe this new area of liability. 68
Following the precedent established in Dillon,6 9 Justice Nix held that
when a plaintiff is outside the zone of danger, the area of liability can
be reasonably circumscribed by applying a foreseeability test, which
62. See - Pa. at -, 404 A.2d at 682-84. See also text accompanying note 52 supra.
63. - Pa. at -, 404 A.2d at 683. Justice Nix rejected the rationale advanced in Tobin,
concluding that to deny an emotionally distressed mother's legitimate claim for relief-merely
because she was not within the zone of danger-by positing hypotheticals of other bystanders
who might seek recovery, is to "mock justice and arbitrarily turn a deaf ear on a compelling
claim. - Pa. at -, 404 A.2d at 683. According to Justice Nix, by arguing that
unlimited liability might result if the zone of danger rule was discarded, the Tobin court was
resorting "to the logical 'gimmick' of reductio ad absurdum." Id. (emphasis supplied by the
court). For a discussion of Tobin, see notes 39-43 and accompanying text supra.
64. - Pa. at -, 404 A.2d at 683. Justice Nix reasoned that, in Sinn, the conduct being
offered as supporting liability-i.e., the negligent operation of the automobile-"has tradition-
ally been held to have been actionable by plaintiffs who had sustained provable damages." Id.
Justice Nix then concluded that a court is justified in expanding the scope of liability flowing
from such conduct because medical and psychiatric advances provide the impetus for legal rec-
ognition of the consequences which follow from the negligent act. Id.
65. Id. at __, 404 A.2d at 681.
66. Id. Concerning the nature of legal duty, the court quoted Dean Prosser's contention
that
[diuty is only a word with which we state our conclusion that there is or is not to be
liability; it necessarily begs the essentidl question. . . .The word serves a useful purpose
in directing attention to the obligation to be imposed upon the defendant, rather than the
causal sequence of events; beyond that it serves none.
Id., quoting Prosser, Pasgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REv. 1, 15 (1953) (footnote omitted).
67. See - Pa. at -__-_, 404 A.2d at 678-84.
68. See id. at - , 404 A.2d at 684-86.
69. Id. at __, 404 A.2d at 685. For a discussion of Dillon, see notes 34-38 and accompany-
ing text supra. It should be noted that there is one important difference between the holdings
of Dillon and Sinn. In Dillon, the court limited its holding to those cases where the plaintiff
suffers a resulting physical injury. See note 37 supra. On the other hand, Justice Nix held that
the absence of physical injury is only a factor in determining the genuineness of the claim. See
note 57 and accompanying text supra.
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asks whether a claimant's emotional injuries were reasonably foresee-
able to the defendant. 70 Justice Nix further held, as a matter of law,
that mental distress and its effects constitute a foreseeable injury
when the bystander is a mother who suffers emotional shock from
witnessing the violent death of her small child.
71
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Eagen stated that recovery
should be permitted to one beyond the zone of danger only if the
plaintiff 1) is closely related to the victim, 2) was near the scene of
the accident, and 3) suffered serious mental distress accompanied by
physical injury or by a severe physical manifestation of the mental
distress. 72
Justice Roberts, in a dissenting opinion in which Justice O'Brien
joined, criticized Justice Nix for replacing the zone of danger doctrine
in bystander cases with a general foreseeability test. 73 According to
the dissent, this standard will only lead to arbitrary results for there
"is no natural non-arbitrary way to limit liability for this injury." 74
Reasoning that uncertainty was sure to follow, Justice Roberts stated
that a jury could not be expected to distinguish between that distress
suffered from witnessing an accident and the natural feeling of grief
70. - Pa. at -, 404 A.2d at 684. Justice Nix paid elaborate attention to the three factors
that the Dillon court deemed relevant in determining foreseeability. Id. at -, 404 A.2d at
685. For a review of those factors, see note 38 supra. Other courts have followed Dillon and
employed the same criteria in considering whether to allow recovery for mental distress. See,
e.g., D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co., 31 Conn. Super. 164, 326 A.2d 129 (1973); Schurk v.
Christensen, 80 Wash. 2d 652, 497 P.2d 937 (1972).
71. - Pa. at -, 404 A.2d at 686. As to other factual situations not posited by this appeal,
the court reasoned that "[j]urisprudentially, the remote and unexpected can best be excluded
by reaching these issues on a more appropriate record." Id. at - n.21, 404 A.2d at 686 n.21.
72. Id. at -, 404 A.2d at 686-87. It is submitted that there are two major differences
distinguishing Chief Justice Eagen's concurring opinion from the opinion of Justice Nix. The
first difference is that Chief Justice Eagen would preclude recovery unless the factors he
enumerated are present; whereas Justice Nix considers these factors as being relevant only with
respect to the question of whether the injury to the plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable. See -
Pa. at -, 404 A.2d at 685; note 70 supra. The second difference is that before allowing
recovery, Chief Justice Eagen would require a plaintiff to prove, in addition to mental distress,
either physical injury or some severe physical manifestation of the emotional harm. Justice Nix,
on the other hand, would require neither physical injury nor resulting physical manifestations of
mental harm. See notes 57-58 and accompanying text supra.
73. See - Pa. at __, 404 A.2d at 690-92 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Rather than expounding
on the benefits of the zone of danger doctrine, the dissent concentrated on negating the
rationale proffered by Justice Nix in permitting recovery for mental distress to bystanders who
are outside the zone of personal danger and who suffer no resulting physical injuries. See id.;
notes 74-78 and accompanying text infra.
74. Id. at -, 404 A.2d at 691 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Concerning the arbitrariness of the
foreseeability standard, Justice Roberts stated that such a limitation "'cannot be applied
evenhandedly and .. .will therefore lead to admittedly arbitrary results. . . . It would ...
frustrate a basic purpose and policy underlying the scope of liability rules, namely, to achieve.
consistently just results by providing for even and predictable resolutions of private disputes."
Id., quoting D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 666-67, 338 A.2d 524, 536 (1975) (Joslin,
J., dissenting).
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accompanying the loss of a loved one. 75  Such a distinction is signifi-
cant, Justice Roberts maintained, because damages for bereavement
occasioned by a loved one's death are not recoverable in Pennsyl-
vania. 76  Thus, the dissent contended that to allow bystander recov-
ery "permits circumvention of the Commonwealth's Wrongful Death
Statute." 77  Moreover, the dissent strongly disagreed with Justice
Nix's elimination of the requirement that a plaintiff's mental anguish
be proved by resulting physical consequences.
78
It is submitted that Justice Nix utilized a logical and functional
approach for deciding the general question of whether bystander re-
covery should be permitted. By establishing a presumption that a
plaintiff suffering emotional trauma through the actions of a
wrongdoer is entitled to legal protection unless sufficient public pol-
icy reasons exist to deny recovery, 79 Justice Nix has determined that
a bystander's right to legal protection from mental harm is paramount
to the burdens imposed on society by the extension of liability. In
reference to whether a particular bystander is entitled to relief, Jus-
tice Nix supported the Dillon approach and promulgated a foreseea-
bility test.80 Since the foreseeability standard permits the court to
75. - Pa. at __ 404 A.2d at 690 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Roberts further stated:
"In fact, one may wonder whether it is not less injurious to a parent's mental state to see the
accident which causes the death of his child than never to know exactly its circumstances." Id.
The dissent maintained that Justice Nix failed to appreciate the extent of the causal problems
involved in bystander recovery cases. See id.
76. See id. at -, 404 A.2d at 692 (Roberts, J., dissenting); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Zebe, 33
Pa. 318, 328-30 (1858) (only pecuniary damage recovered under wrongful death statute). See
also Swartz v. Smokowitz, 400 Pa. 109, 112-13, 161 A.2d 330, 330-32 (1960) (providing formula
for calculating damages under wrongful death statute).
77. - Pa. at __ 404 A.2d at 692 (Roberts, J., dissenting). The dissent recognized that
Pennsylvania's wrongful death statute "specifically provides recovery to a mother injured by the
tortfeasor's negligent killing of her child." Id. Thus, Justice Roberts reasoned that "[riecovery
here only undermines over a century's adherence to the legislative policy that compensation for
damages suffered by the class of individuals to which plaintiff belongs is through the wrongful
death statute." Id. Justice Nix, on the other hand, stated that Justice Roberts "inacurrately
accuses this Court of subverting the Wrongful Death Act" by characterizing the present suit as
one seeking solatium, when in fact, Mrs. Sinn "seeks damages for the emotional injuries she
sustained as a result of witnessing the accident." Id. at - n.3, 404 A.2d at 675 n.3. For the
pertinent part of the wrongful death statute, see note 3 supra. For a discussion of this conflict
between Justices Nix and Roberts, see notes 91-96 and accompanying text infra.
78. Id. at __, 404 A.2d at 688-89 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Noting that society required
from its members a "remarkable degree of emotional fortitude," Justice Roberts stated that "[iut
is not unreasonable to draw the line between that degree which is required and that which is
not by reference to the emotional distress which causes serious physical injury or harm." Id. at
-, 404 A.2d at 688 (Roberts, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that most other jurisdictions
deny recovery for mental distress absent resulting physical injury and that Hawaii is the only
state allowing recovery absent physical harm. See id. at __, 404 A.2d at 689 (Roberts, J.,
dissenting); notes 37 & 57-58 and accompanying text supra.
79. See notes 52-54 and accompanying text supra.
80. See notes 68-71 and accompanying text supra.
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resolve the claim for recovery by examining the specific facts of the
case presented, this approach allows future courts to make proper
policy determinations when deciding whether the case before it war-
rants the imposition of liability.8 ' It is therefore submitted that Jus-
tice Nix's return to the basic tort principles utilized in the earliest
stages of this area of the law,82 is a welcomed departure from the
inelastic rules which had since been employed.8 3
It is suggested, however, that Justice Nix's assumption that a
foreseeability approach is not arbitrary8 4  appears to be
unsupportable.8 5 The foreseeability standard requires judicial under-
standing that arbitrary results must occur, for it remains possible that
a bystander who suffers legitimate damage will be denied relief
because his or her injury is determined to be unforeseeable. 8 6
Nevertheless, although such a standard is arbitrary in that it may
deny recovery to a claimant suffering legitimate injury, it is at least
justifiable in that it allows some flexibility while avoiding the imposi-
tion of undue liability upon defendants. In contrast, the zone of
danger concept is an inflexible rule which fails to consider that emo-
tional distress may be entitled to legal protection in situations other
81. In preferring the foreseeability test over the zone of danger rule, one commentator has
stated:
If a line of circumscription is to be drawn for the sake of public policy, or even in the
application of traditional tort principles, is it not more reasonable and humane to draw it
somewhere other than at the point where no recovery is allowed simply because drawing
the line elsewhere is difficult?
Simons, Psychic Injury and the Bystander: The Transcontinental Dispute Between California
and New York, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 21, 39 (1976). See also Comment, supra note 9 at
1262-63.
82. For a discussion of the traditional tort concepts originally employed by the Pennsylvania
courts in analyzing mental distress cases, see note 19 supra.
83. For a discussion of the development of these rules, see notes 17-43 and accompanying
text supra.
84. See - Pa. at - & n.6, 404 A.2d at 677 & n.6, 678, 683.
85. Dean Prosser has recognized that confining bystander recovery to immediate family
members, or to those plaintiffs present at the scene of the accident, creates an arbitrary rule;
yet he would impose liability under certain conditions designed to draw a line short of
unlimited liability. See W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at 335.
86. Consider, for instance, the situation where a babysitter witnesses a negligently driven
automobile strike and kill the small child entrusted to her care. It is submitted that although
her emotional distress may be just as genuine as that of the child's natural mother, it is unlikely
that the babysitter would recover because she was not related to the victim. The reason for this
conclusion is that under the Dillon approach, which was quoted with approval by Justice Nix,
the plaintiff must be closely related to the victim in order to be deemed "foreseeable." See
Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80; - Pa. at -, 404
A.2d at 685. Although Justice Nix did not expressly adopt this requirement, see id. at - n.21,
404 A.2d at 686 n.21, Chief Justice Eagen, in his concurring opinion, did adopt the close family
relationship test. See id. at -, 404 A.2d at 687 (Eagen, C.J., concurring). Thus, it is probable
that unless a close family relationship is present in this type of mental distress case, a majority
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not permit recovery-even if the emotional harm is
genuine.
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than when the plaintiff fears for his or her own safety.8 7 It is this
type of arbitrary rule which is untenable once it is recognized that
mental distress is a genuine injury. 88
It is further suggested that Justice Nix demonstrated an insight
which other courts have lacked by concluding that advances in
psychiatric science eliminate the need for proving a resulting physical
manifestation to assure the validity of the claim for mental distress.89
Since expert testimony is available to establish that the plaintiff did in
fact suffer emotional harm, it thus seems unnecessary to require proof
of physical consequences to assure the genuineness of the claim.
While the absence of a resulting physical consequence may be an
indication that there was in fact no mental harm,90 such a require-
ment should not absolutely bar legitimate claimants whose trauma
may be internalized.
Although it is commendable that legitimate claims will no longer
be absolutely barred under Justice Nix's approach, it is nevertheless
submitted that the court inadequately resolved the dissent's conten-
tion that the granting of relief in this case would circumvent the
wrongful death statute by permitting recovery for other than
pecuniary loss. 9 ' Justice Nix, while discussing Dillon,92 indicated
that the relationship between the plaintiff and the victim is an impor-
tant factor bearing on recovery. 93 By distinguishing the plaintiff who
is related to the victim from a total stranger witnessing the same
event, Justice Nix inferred that the mental distress suffered by the
related plaintiff is greater than that of the stranger. Therefore, inher-
ent in Justice Nix's reasoning is the conclusion that it is the grief and
bereavement from the loss of a loved one which entitles the related
plaintiff to relief for his more intense emotional harm. 94 But as the
dissent indicated, damages for grief and bereavement are not recov-
erable under Pennsylvania's present interpretation of its wrongful
87. See - Pa. at - 404 A.2d at 678.
88. See notes 13 & 56 and accompanying text supra.
89. See note 57 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of courts which require a
physical manifestation of the alleged emotional distress, see note 37 supra.
90. See - Pa. at , 404 A.2d at 679. Justice Nix concluded that the requirement of a
resulting physical harm should not bar recovery, but should "merely be admissible as evidence
of the degree of mental or emotional distress suffered." Id., quoting Leong v. Takasaki, 55
Hawaii 398, 403, 520 P.2d at 758, 762 (1974). See notes 57-58 and accompanying text supra.
91. - Pa. at -, A.2d at 692 (Roberts, J., dissenting). See note 77 and accompanying text
supra. For pertinent parts of the wrongful death statute, see note 3 supra.
92. For an analysis of the Dillon approach, see notes 34-38 and accompanying text supra;
note 86 supra.
93. - Pa. at -, 404 A.2d at 685-86.
94. See note 75 and accompanying text supra.
1979-1980]
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death statute. 95  Although Justice Nix attempted to avoid this di-
lemma by characterizing Mrs. Sinn's claim as an action for the negli-
gent infliction of mental distress, 96 it is submitted that Justice Nix
failed to reconcile the conflict which his position creates with respect
to this statutory limitation.
97
Because Sinn was decided by a plurality of the court, 98 the im-
pact of this decision is difficult to ascertain. The only segment of Jus-
tice Nix's opinion that was supported by a majority of the justices was
that the zone of danger doctrine should not preclude Mrs. Sinn from
bringing a cause of action for the negligent infliction of mental dis-
tress. 99 With respect to the more general question of what criteria
will be determinative of a bystander's right to recover in future litiga-
tion, the disparate views expressed in Sinn will most likely deter
lower courts from extending recovery to factually dissimilar situa-
tions. 100 Moreover, fears of imposing unlimited and unduly burden-
some liability upon a merely negligent defendant 101 should be
ameliorated by the fact that Justice Nix limited his holding to the
situation where a mother alleges mental harm from witnessing the
violent death of her small child.
10 2
95. See notes 76-77 and accompanying text supra. For the pertinent part of Pennsylvania's
wrongful death statute, see note 3 supra.
96. - Pa. at - n.3, 404 A.2d at 675 n.3. justice Nix reasoned that Mrs. Sinn was not
seeking damages for grief, but was seeking relief for the mental distress which she suffered as a
result of witnessing her child's death. Id. In Justice Nix's view, "[t]hese damages are indepen-
dent of her grief and bereavement." Id.
97. Thus, it is submitted that Justice Nix has created an anomalous situation whereby Mrs.
Sinn would be denied recovery for grief and bereavement had she brought a claim for wrongful
death, yet may recover such damages in an action in tort for the negligent infliction of mental
distress.
98. See note 8 supra.
99. It is submitted that since Justice Larsen only concurred in the result, one should not
read his concurrence beyond the facts of this case. Therefore, the decision of the majority of the
Justices is similarly limited to the facts of Sinn. Furthermore, the elimination of the require-
ment that the plaintiff prove resulting physical injury from the mental distress is supported only
in the opinion of Justice Nix, with whom Justice Manderino joined.
100. See note 8 supra. Since the holding in Sinn is limited to the factual situation before the
court, see note 99 and accompanying text supra, Pennsylvania is left without a standard for
determining the extent to which recovery will be permitted. If the lower courts were to follow
the foreseeability approach proposed by Justice Nix, it is possible that unlimited and unduly
burdensome liability could be imposed upon the defendant, as feared by the Tobin court. See
note 43 and accompanying text supra. However, considering Justice Nix's rationale behind
adopting the foreseeability standard-that Mrs. Sinn, while witnessing the violent death of her
daughter, may very likely have suffered legitimate emotional harm-it is submitted that
Pennsylvania courts will either follow the plurality opinion of Justice Nix and not impose liabil-
ity beyond the facts of Sinn, or else adopt the more restrictive standards set up by Chief Justice
Eagen. See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
101. See notes 61-66 and accompanying text supra.
102. - Pa. at -, 404 A.2d at 686. justice Nix maintained that in such a situation mental
distress is a foreseeable injury. Other authorities believe that the foreseeability approach is
incapable of limiting liability. See - Pa. at -, 404 A.2d at 691 (Roberts, J., dissenting); note
43 and accompanying text supra. Concerning the guidelines for limiting liability articulated in
16
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Finally, it is suggested that the decision in Sinn should be
viewed as only an exception to the zone of danger rule, not a com-
plete abrogation of that doctrine. 10 3 Consequently, future plaintiffs
who are exposed to personal danger will not be precluded from rely-
ing on the zone of danger rule to set forth a cause of action for mental
distress. It is submitted that only those claimants who do not fear for
their own safety will be forced to rely on the foreseeability standard
to prove their case.
Justice Nix has, it is suggested, correctly decided that the
arbitrary limitations imposed by the zone of danger rule, and by the
requirement that the plaintiff suffer resulting physical harm, should
no longer prevent bystanders who suffer mental distress from reach-
ing the trier of fact. Thus, Justice Nix has placed great confidence in
the ability of juries to evaluate claims for emotional harm according to
the traditional principles of negligence law. 10 4 While our system of
jurisprudence theoretically requires such confidence, the practical
question of how far this liability for negligently inflicted mental dis-
tress will be extended remains unanswered after Sinn.
Bruce A. Issadore
Dillon, the dissent in Dillon stated that "notwithstanding the limitations which these 'guidelines'
purport to impose, it is only reasonable to expect pressure upon our trial courts to make their
future rulings conform to the spirit of the new elasticity proclaimed by the majority." 68 Cal. 2d
at 749, 441 P.2d at 926, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 86 (Burke, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the
guidelines established by the majority in Dillon, see note 38 supra.
103. It should be noted that since Deborah Sinn, the decedent's sister, was located within
the zone of danger, the trial court held that she could proceed with her cause of action for
emotional distress. See note 6 and accompanying text supra. Justice Nix, noting that the defend-
ant had not appealed from the trial court's refusal to strike Deborah's claim, concluded that
"the propriety of that decision is not before us." __ Pa. at - n.2, 404 A.2d at 674 n.2.
104. See note 82 and accompanying text supra.
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